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In a previous article in this series,
Lewis Wolpert [1] introduced the
good fairy godmother of science
(GOOFGOOS) who, like a Greek
oracle, will answer one specific
question. My question to her would
address the heart of cognitive
neuroscience: the relationship
between our perceptions, thoughts
and memories and the activity of
nerve cells that must somehow be
responsible for the associated
subjective experience. Understanding
this relationship entails pinpointing
the neuronal populations in the brain
that express the correlates of
consciousness. So my question is, “are
there specific neurons whose activity
mediates consciousness?” That is,
neurons whose firing gives rise to the
current content of my consciousness? 
Rather than consciousness being
expressed by some global, neuronal
assembly that includes all neurons in
some area of the brain, this hypothesis
is based on the assumption that the
firing activity of a specific cell class is
solely responsible for mediating
consciousness [2]. If — with some yet
to be invented technique — one could
directly stimulate such neurons in an
awake human, the subject should have
the experience associated with the
features encoded by these nerve cells. 
Since the days of Penfield’s
experiments with awake patients, we
have known that direct cortical
stimulation can lead to conscious
experience. But is this is caused by a
cell class with unique properties —
pyramidal cells projecting directly to
the frontal lobe, for example, or cells
located in a specific cortical layer that
make specific local connections and
express a unique set of ion channels?
A hint of such neurons can be found
in recordings from the brain of an
awake monkey while it performs a
binocular rivalry task, in which the
two eyes see different images. The
vast majority of cells in the cortical
motion area MT that follow the
changing perception of the monkey —
as reported by its key presses — rather
than the constant visual stimulus, are
located in lower layers and are not
spread equally across all layers [3].
Most interestingly from the point
of view of molecular biologists, if such
neurons exist, it is only a question of
time before specific markers, such as
antibodies that label them, are found.
(This is not as unlikely as it sounds: at
least one monoclonal antibody is
known to bind to antigens on the cell
surface of neurons in the magno-
cellular ‘motion’ pathways in the
cortex of primates, including humans
[4].) The next step will be to
transiently inactivate all such cells.
The existence of such neurons
would be a further confirmation of
the grand theme of specificity that
runs through modern biology — for
example, the specificity of a protein
that will let a sodium but not a
potassium ion pass through the cell
membrane, or in the genetic
sequence for a voltage-dependent
sodium channel that encodes a
calcium channel instead if a single
amino acid is replaced; in terms of
cells, this is the specificity of a neuron
in the monkey brain that is strongly
triggered by viewing a particular face
but is indifferent to most other faces. 
Descartes told us 300 years ago
that the seat of the “soul” was in the
pineal gland, whereas we now think it
might be in a subpopulation of
pyramidal cells in a specific layer in
cortex. Where’s the big difference?
The GOOFGOOS’s affirmative
answer would be just the beginning of
our quest to understand
consciousness. If there are such cells,
where they project to will reveal a lot.
Do they, for instance, have axons that
exclusively contact neurons in the
higher, motor-planning stages of the
brain? Or will the ‘consciousness
neurons’ in the lower part of the visual
hierarchy project to the lower parts of
the motor hierarchy, and neurons
toward the top of the visual hierarchy
project to the highest stages of the
motor-planning hierarchy? And what
does the connectivity of these neurons
tell us about tying together activity
from different sensory modalities into
a unique, perceptual experience? 
What about the crucial role of
short-term memory in consciousness?
Will its neural correlate be found
exclusively at synapses associated
with ‘consciousness neurons’? And
how does the time-scale of activation
of these neurons correlate with
perceptual time-scales? There are
many mental diseases that affect
consciousness, such as schizophrenia,
or autism: can they be related to
specific loss of these neurons? At the
moment, we know of no really
compelling arguments for the
existence of ‘consciousness’ neurons.
It is possible, after all, that any one
neuron in the cortical system can, at
any given time, express some correlate
of consciousness. However, if specific
neuronal correlates of consciousness
do exist, it would be a great pity to
miss them for want of looking. 
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